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4. LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT-PATHET LAO NEGOTIATIONS

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In negotiations between the Laotian government and the Pathet Lao, which began in Vientiane on 1 August, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has proposed an agenda calling for cessation of hostilities, restoration of royal control in Phong Saly and Sam Neua Provinces, and integration of the Pathets into the national community without discrimination. Prince Souphannouvong,

leader of the six-man Pathet delegation, has advanced a broader agenda including the formation of a coalition government, guarantees of the rights of the Pathet troops, and the "question of neutrality."

In his opening statement, Souvanna reassured the Pathet delegation of Laos' "strict adherence" to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and emphasized that the Laotian people must not be disappointed in their hopes for a settlement at this time. Souvanna stated this settlement must be based, in general, on the Geneva accords and the recommendations of the International Truce Commission.

The American ambassador in Vientiane notes the absence of the pro-American Deputy Premier Katay from the delegation. Souvanna has said he feared Katay's pro-Western reputation would increase Pathet Lao suspicions of the validity of Laotian independence.

Souvanna has indicated that negotiations will be conducted by subordinate officials for "three or four days," after which he and Souphannouvong would hold a final meeting to close out the negotiations.

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5.	COMMUNIST	CRITICISM	OF	INDONESIAN	GOVERNMENT

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The Indonesian Communist newspaper

Harian Rakjat printed an editorial on

August which probably constitutes the strongest criticism that the Communists have yet leveled against the coalition gov-

ernment of Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo. Although the strongly anti-Communist Masjumi received its usual slaps, the editorial was apparently also aimed at the new moderate leadership of the National Party, which heads the coalition government.

Heretofore, the Communists have been pressing for a united front and have sought to promote relations with the National Party at the expense of the Masjumi. Because of the apparent shift toward moderation in Indonesian national politics, as indicated by President Sukarno's recent praise of the US and the emergence of the National Party's right wing as its dominant faction, the Communist Party may be finding itself forced into an opposition role.

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 6. TEST OF	STRENGTH M	IAY BE SHAPING UP	IN SYRIA
		a test of strength	n between rightist
		leftist elements may b	oe shaping up in
		a. Two cabinet minis le leftist Arab Socialis	
		y (ASRP), have repor	
		esign if President Quw the death sentences p	
	bers	of the rightist Syrian	Social National-
		Party involved in the a	
	ASR.	Parmy leader in Apri	TT 1900°
	m	rightistsconservativ	
leftist inf nation of slowly an rightist o	a group of ser luence in the a Chief of Staff S d the leftists h r leftist faction which to base t	nior army officersmarmy on 7 July when the Shuqayr. Since then, have had time to organ in the army may be the use of force to estable.	noved to eliminate ney forced the resig- they have moved ize. Either the seeking a political ablish itself in
1 August		American army attack more than the usual n	
officers i	n Damascus.	He suggested that they	y might be there
to assess	the situation a	and to align their force	es.
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